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AL GORE'S RECIPE FOR SUCCESS

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The office of Vice President of the United States is not a position to which many aspire. The Vice Presidency is mentioned just five times in the Constitution, with duties limited to serving as President of the Senate and to being the emergency successor to the President. Until the latter half of the twentieth century, service as Vice President usually marked the unheralded end of a political career. Since World War II the role of the Vice President has gradually assumed greater significance both politically and bureaucratically. Several Vice Presidents, including - Nixon, Mondale, Bush and even the much-maligned Quayle - have played substantive roles during their time in office, taking on special projects and/or providing advice to the President.¹ The latest in this line of activist Vice Presidents is Al Gore. However, Gore has taken the role to new heights, extending the model that was there to its ultimate degree.² Although Gore's specific list of duties may not be unprecedented, he likely has more influence with the President than any of his predecessors did during their terms in office. One area in which Gore has proven highly influential is the making of national security policy. Gore has been able to reach selectively into important areas of foreign policy, performing tasks that in other administrations were reserved strictly for the Secretary of State.³ In a recent piece written for the Presidential Studies Quarterly, Paul Kengor states that Vice President Gore has, at times, "filled the traditional roles of the President, the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor."⁴ This unprecedented national security policy influence is the result of three unique and convergent factors: a foreign policy leadership vacuum, Gore's own capabilities, and most significantly, the creation of a new bureaucratic entity, the Binational Commission, to manage the conduct of foreign relations with key nation-states.

Nature abhors a vacuum, and so does the U.S. government. During his candidacy and the early years of his Presidency, Bill Clinton was very open about his preference for domestic

policy issues over foreign policy issues. He even used his proclivity as a campaign theme, accusing President Bush of spending too much time on foreign policy. Consequently, during his first term, Clinton neglected foreign policy issues and left their formulation and conduct entirely to his senior advisors. However, the Clinton foreign policy team was not up to the task. Warren Christopher, the Secretary of State, was regarded as a cautious and uninspiring lawyer. Tony Lake, the professorial National Security Advisor, was a self-described “neo-Wilsonian” who was more given to academic reflection than to practical policy construction. At Defense, Les Aspin followed the Lake model while his successor, Bill Perry was considered a technocrat. The result was a rudderless foreign policy that left disasters like Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti in its wake. By the fall of 1993 it had become clear to Clinton that the leadership vacuum had to be addressed. Yet Clinton did not want to fire any of the principals. The “Gore Solution” was the brainchild of Clinton advisors Gergen and McLarty and, ironically, was heartily endorsed by Christopher who apparently saw value in delegation.⁵ Gore had already been urging Clinton to pay more attention to foreign policy, act decisively and accept the consequences.⁶ Consequently, Clinton asked Gore “to speak out more on foreign policy issues.”⁷ The move was never formally discussed, nor were there any consultations with Congress.⁸ No directive was issued and Gore, officially, received no new authority. There was never even an announcement of Gore’s new elevated status.

Gore’s new foreign policy power then, was reflected. He had no authority independent of the President. However, in the physical world, an object that is constructed of the right material will absorb reflected energy and begin to generate its own heat. This same phenomenon occurred in the political world with Gore. Fortunately for Clinton, Gore had both the qualifications and the capabilities to become a lead, if not *the* lead figure on the Clinton foreign

policy team. Gore had sixteen years of experience on Capitol Hill in both the House and Senate. While in the Senate he served on the Armed Services Committee, tackling such international issues as the ABM treaty. Gore was known to be vocal on foreign policy issues, supporting the Gulf War (unlike most of his Democratic colleagues) and U.S. intervention in Bosnia. His interests as a U.S. Senator in environmental and non-proliferation issues had also given him exposure to and experience in the international arena. Unlike Clinton, Gore had also served in the military and therefore had an understanding of the military instrument of power. Gore brought his own pro-active and decisive operating style that was sorely needed on the foreign policy team. Additionally, he had an experienced foreign policy advisor in Leon Fuerth, a former Foreign Service Officer and arms control expert. Fuerth knew Washington, the Executive Branch, and more importantly, the arcane, convoluted interagency foreign policy making apparatus. He could work "the system" and make "the system" work for him and his boss. Fuerth also had the unique distinction among Vice Presidential national security advisors of having a seat at the table in both Deputy and Principal Committee (DC and PC) meetings.⁹ This provided unprecedented opportunities for Gore to influence the policy-making process at multiple levels. Gore's office could play in the inter-agency discussions and wrangling that took place at these meetings, and Gore, armed with details about the ebb and flow of the discussions which usually would not be included in the meeting summary for the President, could engage Clinton directly in their weekly one-on-one meetings. This, of course, was Gore's most significant advantage. Warren Christopher once commented that, "Gore is relied on more heavily than any Vice President has ever been in the past. Not just in foreign policy, but as far as I can tell, across the board."¹⁰ Gore, on his own, had achieved a unique status with the President based on Clinton's respect for Gore's expertise and sense of "realpolitik."¹¹ Gore, along with or

behind First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, is considered to be the President's closest advisor, and the President seldom makes a major decision without his input ¹² Gore's status with the President -- and the fact that it was recognized within the inter-agency -- gave the Vice President as much if not more power than any Constitutional or statutory authority could ever have achieved. From a bureaucratic stand point, the Office of the Vice President (OVP) had become an important stop on the way to the Oval Office. There is no better illustration of this fact than Warren Christopher's Friday lunches with the Vice President. Christopher could not get on the President's calendar, so he made it a point to meet regularly with Gore noting that Gore would be " a very influential figure if we talk something through " ¹³

The third factor that has made the most significant contribution to the breadth and depth of Gore's national security policy influence is his development of the Binational Commission as a bureaucratic tool for managing relations with selected key nation-states. The Commission concept was born at the Clinton-Yeltsin Vancouver Summit in April 1993. The U S /Russia Commission, which would be co-chaired by Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, was originally designed to enhance cooperation in the areas of space and energy, but in a pattern that would be repeated in later Commissions, it quickly absorbed the U S /Russian Business Development Committee which had been dedicated to expanding trade, investment, and commercial cooperation. The U S /Russia Binational Commission, also known as the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC), met for the first time in September 1993. The Commission met again in December 1993 and soon decided to expand its substantive mandate even further. The GCC grew from three committees to eight, adding defense conversion, health, science and technology, the environment, and agribusiness. The apparent success of the GCC inspired OVP to apply the model elsewhere. In September 1994 during a State visit, Clinton and

South African President Nelson Mandela announced the establishment of the U S /South Africa Binational Commission which Gore would co-chair with his counter-part Deputy President Thabo M'Beki. From the beginning, the South African Commission's substantive mandate was relatively broad, including agriculture, science and technology, trade, education, energy, and the environment. In the summer of 1997 it added a seventh committee to cover defense and political/military issues. Since 1994, Egypt, Ukraine, and Khazakstan have been added to the list of Vice Presidential Binational Commission countries. There is a strong possibility that China may be next ¹⁴

BNC operations vary slightly among Commissions, but in general the co-chairs hold a Plenary Commission meeting at least once a year -- and in several cases twice a year -- in alternating capitols. Several days prior to the plenary sessions, members of the Commissions' various Committees will hold their own meetings during which working-level officials from both sides provide up-dates for their principals on the various projects they have underway. During the plenary session with the Vice President, Committee co-chairs, who are usually Cabinet level officials, highlight specific accomplishments, such as the signing of a tax treaty (bureaucratically known as "deliverables"), since the last Commission meeting. In the case of Russia, South Africa, Ukraine, and Khazakstan, the breadth of their Commissions' mandates results in almost the entire scope of bilateral relations being addressed in the plenary sessions. In addition to the Commission plenary session, Gore will also have a private substantive meeting with his counterpart. These meetings are used to resolve issues that could not be resolved at the Committee level and to discuss sensitive issues that would not be dealt with by the Committees or in public. They are critical to the success of the BNCs and to the overall tenor of the bilateral relationship.

While the BNCs' impact on the external aspects of U S foreign relations generally is the most visible -- and therefore receives the most attention -- its impact on the internal national security policy workings of the Executive Branch is no less significant. Gore's BNCs have allowed his policy-making influence to extend beyond the lofty issues that are debated in the DC and PC meetings down to the more mundane but no less important issues that form the backbone of U S foreign bilateral relationships. The BNCs have generated greater Vice Presidential involvement in crafting the policies behind the external relations. Prior to reaching the DC and PC level, U S national security policy is normally developed through a bureaucratic process dominated by organizations (i e State, NSC, DoD etc). Seats at the table are allocated based on organizational responsibilities and related equities. The creation of the BNCs put Gore in charge of an organization that has officially designated responsibilities for promoting and enhancing bilateral relations with the BNC countries. This gives the Vice President natural organizational equities that he otherwise would not have in the development of policies related to those countries. For example, normally even a pro-active Vice President would have little interest in whether or not an International Military Education and Training Program was established in a specific country. However, under the current circumstances, if that country were a BNC country and if the program could be perceived as enhancing bilateral ties, OVP would be interested. Additionally, the BNC's requirement for sustained Vice Presidential involvement on an issue over time differs significantly from the various ad hoc, one time or short term foreign policy missions that Vice Presidents have been given in the past. Notwithstanding Gore's protestations that he only comes off the bench to fill in when needed, the reality is that through "ownership" of a new foreign policy "organization", Gore and his office have achieved permanent player status in selected areas of national security policy making. However, Gore is not just any player

Consequently, the inter-agency process has taken on some new dimensions

Several factors can be used to analyze how and to what extent the BNCs impact on OVP's role in the inter-agency policy-making process. These include the range of issues on which OVP will engage, the intensity of OVP engagement, OVP's role as a policy-maker or facilitator, and OVP's relationship to the other players. Due to Gore's role as a general advisor to the President and Leon Fuerth's attendance at all DC and PC meetings, Gore and his office engage to some extent on all national security policy issues. However the depth of OVP's engagement varies with their perceived equities in an issue. Consequently, OVP is the most proactive on any issues that relate to the BNC countries ¹⁵ OVP also focuses on issues in the functional areas of economics, science and technology, and the environment -- in which Gore has a personal interest ¹⁶ Those are also the issues on which OVP will engage outside of the DC/PC process

The intensity of OVP engagement on their focus issues varies over time. Gore has a foreign policy staff of only eight, including Fuerth, his deputy and six action officers ¹⁷ They are not capable of remaining fully engaged on all focus issues or BNC countries all the time. The office therefore, operates in a "surge" mode, engaging fully on BNC country issues roughly eight to ten weeks prior the BNC meeting. Once a BNC is completed, OVP will shift focus to the next BNC on the schedule. During the periods between BNCs, OVP generally leaves the various Committees to pursue their tasks without much direct interference unless there are significant problems or policy changes. The only exceptions are those sensitive issues that are handled directly by Gore and his BNC counterpart. On those issues OVP will remain engaged on a relatively steady basis. For example, OVP was the key player in U S /South African efforts to craft a legal settlement in the case of two South African government-owned companies indicted

for illegal arms exports from the U S ¹⁸ This required significant OVP involvement in-between the bi-annual U S /South African BNCs For the most part however, OVP's policy influence on any given issue or BNC country tends to be episodic Not surprisingly, many BNC Committees follow the same pattern, often letting projects lie dormant until they are driven into action by the need to provide a "deliverable" in time for the next BNC If nothing else, BNCs are action forcing events

On its focus issues, OVP plays both the roles of facilitator and policy-maker Although opinions tend to differ on the extent to which they fill one role or the other, there is general consensus that they act in both capacities ¹⁹ As a facilitator, OVP identifies bottlenecks in the policy process and uses its authority to try to break them For example, the State Department was unable to get the Treasury Department to focus on developing a tax treaty with South Africa Since the treaty was key to establishing closer trade and economic ties (one of the missions of the BNC), State alerted OVP which then "persuaded" Treasury to make the South Africa tax treaty a top priority ²⁰ This also illustrates the way in which inter-agency players can use OVP to advance their own agendas Beyond breaking specific bottlenecks, OVP facilitates the general development of policies and projects by requiring "deliverables" for each BNC meeting Departments that participate in the BNCs must be able to demonstrate an accomplishment, or at least forward progress toward a goal, at each BNC meeting OVP acts a policy-maker through the establishment policy priorities A case in point would be OVP's advocacy of reprogramming AID funds to the Department of Energy (DOE) in order to bolster what OVP considered to be a higher priority DOE project in South Africa ²¹ OVP also acted as a policy-maker in forcing DoD to establish a defense committee with South Africa under the BNC umbrella DoD had wanted to follow its normal practice of establishing formal defense relations through a Joint Military

Commission that is usually run at the Assistant Secretary of Defense level. However OVP opposed an independent defense entity and demanded its inclusion in the BNC at the Cabinet level. OVP's actions as both a facilitator and policy maker demonstrate OVP's power relative to the other inter-agency players. As one official noted, when OVP chooses to become engaged, the normal inter-agency egalitarian, competitive consensus-building process is transformed into a centralized and hierarchical process. "OVP can trump all the players in the interagency."²²

OVP's relationships with key inter-agency players such as NSC, State and DoD varies. Of the three, OVP's relationship with NSC is the most collegial. OVP relies on NSC for the depth of its expertise on the issues. Coordination between the two is described as excellent and their working relationship is described as cooperative.²³ However, they are not entirely equal partners. When OVP becomes fully engaged on an issue, the responsible NSC office tends to fade into the background and at most appears to act in an advisory capacity. This appears to be particularly true in the case of the BNCs where NSC has no formal role. Although NSC appears to emerge from the shadows when the BNC is over, some government officials familiar with the BNC process believe that NSC's overall policy influence is muted in BNC countries.²⁴

OVP's relationship with the State Department is more complex. In essence, the BNCs can be seen as a usurpation of State foreign relations authorities. In fact, former Secretary of State Christopher did consciously "delegate" some of his authorities, saying, "I can only be in one place at a time. No Secretary of State can do it all. It would be foolish if he thought he could."²⁵ So in some cases, such as South Africa, State appears to have acquiesced willingly. However, in others, such as Russia, senior policy makers at State maintained a strong interest. As a result more tension exists.²⁶ In areas where State has "ceded" authority, State officials claim that they respond directly to OVP on BNC issues without consulting their chain of command.²⁷

However, their State Department leadership will be provided with informational copies of their work²⁸ The State/OVP relationship is unique in that State acts as the unofficial “secretariat” for the BNCs, coordinating logistics and providing substantive background information Like NSC, State has no formal role in the BNCs and so is eclipsed by OVP However through provision of background information and talking points to OVP in preparation for the BNCs, State has substantive input into the system It is unlikely that the new Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, will challenge the current arrangement with OVP as she is personally close to the Vice President and he strongly supported her nomination²⁹

OVP’s relations with DoD are still evolving, as defense committees are a relatively new addition to the BNC mandates As the only major foreign policy player with formal participation in the BNC, its relationship with OVP will be somewhat different than NSC and State However, it is likely that, within certain parameters, DoD will be able to maintain relative freedom of action regarding its defense relations with BNC countries, particularly if it consistently produces “deliverables” for the BNC meetings

The primary difference between Gore and some of his more pro-active predecessors in office is not in the area of capabilities Gore is no more or less capable in the area of foreign policy than Nixon, Mondale or Bush The unprecedented level of Gore’s influence comes from the fact he had the unique opportunity to exercise his capabilities due to the foreign policy leadership vacuum in the Clinton Administration and his development of the BNC which extended his influence in the national security policy-making process

NOTES

¹ Kengor, Paul, "The Foreign Policy Role of Vice President Al Gore," Presidential Studies Quarterly

27, no 1 (Winter 1997) 14

² "Lexington Reinventing the Vice Presidency," The Economist 332, no 7880 (September 10, 1994) 30

³ Kengor, "The Foreign Policy Role of Vice President Al Gore," 14

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Hosenball, Mark and Isikoff, Michael, "Al Gore Talk a Lot and Carry a Big Stick," Newsweek, (October 31, 1994) 30

⁷ "More Gore," The New Republic 209, no 23, (December 6, 1993) 14

⁸ Ibid

⁹ White House official, interview by author, written notes, Washington DC, 24 November 1997

¹⁰ Hosenball, Mark and Isikoff, Michael, "Al Gore Talk a Lot and Carry a Big Stick," 30

¹¹ "A Vice President Who Counts," U S News and World Report 115, no 3, (July 1993) 30

¹² Kengor, "The Foreign Policy Role of Vice President Al Gore," 14

¹³ Hosenball, Mark and Isikoff, Michael, "Al Gore Talk a Lot and Carry a Big Stick," 30

¹⁴ White House official, interview by author, written notes, Washington DC, 24 November 1997

¹⁵ White House official, interview by author, written notes, Washington DC, 24 November 1997

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ State Department official, interview by author, written notes, Washington DC, 14 November 1997

¹⁹ State, DoD and Administration officials, multiple interviews by author, written notes, Washington DC, November 1997

²⁰ State Department official, interview by author, written notes, Washington DC, 14 November 1997

²¹ Ibid

²² Confidential Source, interviewed by author, written notes, Washington DC, November 1997

²³ Administration official, interview by author, written notes, Washington DC, 28 November 1997

²⁴ State Department and DoD officials, interviewed by author, written notes, Washington DC, November 1997

²⁵ Kengor, "The Foreign Policy Role of Vice President Al Gore," 14

²⁶ White House official, interview by author, written notes, Washington DC, 24 November 1997

²⁷ State Department official, interview by author, written notes, Washington DC, 14 November 1997

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ White House official, interview by author, written notes, Washington DC, 24 November 1997